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This paper presents the results of experimental auctions of the orange juice processed 
with the pulsed electric field (PEF) technology.  A series of experimental auctions are 
conducted to elicit consumers’ willingness to pay (WTP) for the PEF orange juice along with 
WTP for three other types of orange juice: unprocessed (fresh), thermally processed 
not-from-concentrate, and thermally processed from-concentrate orange juice.  We adopt the 
second-price sealed-bid auction.  With this auction method, the highest bidder claims the 
product at the price equal to the second highest bid.   
 
The auction results show that unprocessed “fresh” juice had the highest mean bidding 
price of $2.68/half gallon.  The second-highest mean bidding price was for PEF juice at 
$2.48/half gallon; the third-highest was for not-from-concentrate juice at $1.95/half gallon; and 
the lowest was for concentrate juice at $1.31/half gallon.  The bids were affected by product 
tasting.    The largest change in the mean bidding price occurred to the PEF juice, which dropped 




Keywords: Auction Experiment, Pulsed Electric Field, Willingness to Pay, Orange Juice 
 
 
Research supported by a competitive grant from the Ohio Agricultural Research and 
Development Center (OARDC). The authors would like to express their appreciation to Howard 
Zhang for his collaboration and assistance in providing PEF orange juice used in the experiment 
and to Matthew Rousu for his assistance and suggestions on our experimental auction design.  3
Introduction 
 
For marketing a new product, there is no historical market data on quantities, prices, or 
expenditures available for assessing the demand potential or estimating its demand function. 
Under this situation, we have to employ different methods for market evaluation. One such 
approach is the contingent valuation method (CVM) commonly used for assessing consumers’ 
willingness to pay (WTP) for such non-market commodities as clean water or clean air.  
However, the CVM is based on a consumer survey with hypothetical questions and without real 
budget constraint. In order to overcome these shortcomings, there has been growing interest in 
using experimental auction for eliciting the WTP for food safety (Hayes, et al.) or genetically 
modified foods (Lusk, et al.). 
The objective of this study is to elicit the WTP for an orange juice produced by a new 
technology called the pulsed electric field (PEF) processing. The PEF, as to be described in more 
detail later, can process fruit juice such as orange juice to preserve its freshness. In order to elicit 
the WTP for the PEF juice, we can employ the CVM with attempts to describe this new 
technology in the survey. We recognize that the description of the attributes may affect the 
outcome of the WTP estimation. For a good such as food and for an attribute such as freshness, 
the description of an attribute developed by a new technology may not be persuasive unless the 
consumer has the opportunity to taste the product. For this reason, we employ an experimental 
auction to obtain the WTP for orange juice produced by the PEF. One of the main objectives is 
to test whether or not the product tasting alter the consumer’s WTP and if so, the WTP with 
product tasting would be more credible for assessing the market potential for any new food 
product such as the PEF processed orange juice. 
The PEF technology can be applied to all juices such as tomato and apple juice as well 
as other products such as yogurt and salad dressing. We select orange juice because it is   4
currently the most consumed fruit juice in the market. The results of our study are useful for the 
orange industry and the manufacturers of the PEF. 
 
Pulsed Electric Field Processing 
The Pulsed Electric Field (PEF) process is a nonthermal process used to inactivate enzymes and 
microorganisms in liquid food.  It was developed primarily to minimize the loss and 
degradation of food quality attributes that might occur during thermal processing. In the PEF 
process, the food to be processed undergoes electric field pulses that will destroy the cell wall of 
enzymes and microorganisms. 
The PEF process was first developed in 1960 by a German scientist named 
Doevenspeck. In 1967, Sale and Hamilton, and Hamilton and Sale published studies of their 
observations on the cell structure of microorganisms that had undergone a PEF treatment.  
Subsequent studies examined various potentials of the PEF process, and two main venues of 
application emerged from this line of research: 
(1) Reversible  Electroporation,  where the cell is given an electric shock in order to transfer 
DNA to the cell, and 
(2)  PEF treatment for the inactivation of microorganisms and enzymes. 
The basic difference between these two processes is the strength of electric field pulses, 
which is low in the Reversible Electroporation (5-15 kV/cm) and high in the PEF treatment for 
food processing (more than 18kV/cm) (Dunn).  Although the former has a great potential for 
scientific research, the latter is more immediate for commercial application with respect to the 
food industry.  Thus, we will study the market potential of the PEF technology as applied to a 
marketable food product.  The current forefront of the latter PEF research focuses on the   5
physical, chemical, and microbiological effects of PEF treatment of liquid food materials such as 
orange juice, apple juice, skim milk, yogurt, and eggs.   
Among the category of citrus fruit juice, orange juice is the most popular drink in the 
U.S. market.  Freshness is arguably the most important factor in the buying decision of 
consumers.  The thermal process (a.k.a., pasteurization) is currently the industry standard 
treatment, but it causes an irreversible loss of fresh fruit flavor and various nutrients as well as an 
undesirable browning in the color of the juice (Yeom et al.; Jia, Zhang, and Min).   On the 
other hand, fresh orange juice has a higher risk of undergoing unfavorable quality degradations 
as a result of microbiological and enzymatic activities, which might cause adverse health effects 
upon consumption.  Therefore, the PEF orange juice should have a great competitive edge 
against both unprocessed and pasteurized orange juice because the PEF process destroys 
microorganisms and enzymes while retaining the flavor compound. 
Despite its apparent benefits, the PEF process has not been applied on a commercial 
basis yet because the information on its process mechanism and its advantages has not been 
disseminated well, let alone appreciated by the food industry.  Hence, a team of food scientists 
produced the PEF orange juice in the PEF pilot production plant at the Ohio State University 
(Akdemir Evrendilek et al.).  For this purpose, they obtained fresh Valencia oranges, peeled 
them, homogenized them with a laboratory blender, and then filtered them to remove the pulp.  
Some of the freshly squeezed orange juice was set aside for comparison in the later consumer 
evaluation experiment.  The remaining orange juice was pumped through the heat exchangers 
without any heating and then went through the PEF process in the PEF treatment chambers.  
Upon completion, the PEF orange juice was aseptically packaged in half gallon  bottles.  Figure 
1 illustrates the PEF process in its entirety.     
   6
Literature Review 
Experimental auction market has been gaining popularity as a method of measuring consumers’ 
willingness to pay for nonmarketed commodities: e.g., food safety (Hayes et al.), meat produced 
with a genetically engineered growth enhancer (Buhr et al.), and vacuum-packaged beef 
(Hoffman et al.).  In an experimental auction, consumers bid for an auctioned product, and the 
winner will pay real money for it.  This is an advantage over a contingent valuation survey, 
where no real transactions are involved.  As Hoffman et al. note, experimental auction is an 
especially useful tool for marketers of novel products because it not only measures consumers’ 
acceptance of the product but also yields an endogenously determined market price.
1  
Moreover, it can easily incorporate product testing, which is especially useful for food products 
for which palatability is an important factor (Melton et al.). 
There are several auction methods to choose from, but the second-price Vickrey auction 
has attracted most attention in the estimation of willingness to pay because of its simplicity and 
its demand-revealing property.
2  Namely, in this auction, each individual’s (weakly) dominant 
strategy is to bid his/her own valuation truthfully under the independent private values 
assumption (Milgrom and Weber).  There is evidence, however, that the participants may not 
reveal their private values in laboratory experiments.  Knetsch et al. cast a doubt on the 
demand-revealing property of the Vickrey auction by showing the discrepancy between the 
willingness-to-pay and willingness-to-accept values with regard to a mug cup in a ninth-price 
Vickrey auction.    However, their results do not quite disprove the demand revealing property of 
the second-price Vickrey auction but rather point out those participants may behave differently if 
they perceive themselves off the margin or on the margin.  Shogren et al. (2001) propose the 
random nth-price auction with the view to engaging otherwise disengaged participants, but it has   7
not proved to be a uniformly better method than the second-price Vickrey auction, which is still 
one of the most attractive auction mechanisms to implement in laboratory experiments.     
Nonetheless, it is still worth considering how to motivate off-margin bidders to bid 
truthfully.  To meet this challenge, we consider a multi-product single-unit second-price 
Vickrey auction, in which four substitute products are sold.  In this auction, each participant 
bids for four competing products simultaneously but is allowed to buy only one of the four 
products.    Because participants can purchase at most one unit of one product, demand reduction 
predicted in multi-unit auctions is not an issue (for demand reduction in a multi-unit auctions, see 
List and Lucking-Reiley).    With a winner determined for each of the products, each participant 
has a greater chance of buying a product (i.e., being on-margin) than if there is only one 
auctioned product.  Moreover, the participants are reminded of familiar substitute products, so 
they can easily obtain a basic idea about appropriate price of the innovative (our focus) product.   
Thus, a multi-product single-unit auction seems to be a good mechanism to use when the purpose 




Each experimental session consists of two stages of repeated auction trials with the binding trial 
chosen randomly at the end of each stage.  Many studies done in the context of estimating 
willingness to pay for nonmarketed commodities have used repeated trials with one binding trial 
chosen randomly after all the trials are over (Shogren et al. 1994, Buhr et al., and Hayes et al.).  
The usual explanation for repeating trials is that participants require market experience to 
understand that sincere bidding is the dominant strategy (Coppinger, Smith, and Titus) and to 
realize their true valuation of unfamiliar products (Shogren, List, and Hayes.).  The use of 
repeated trials is, perhaps, not as controversial as the announcement of winning price after each   8
trial.  It is possible that participants do not reveal their true valuations but just respond to the 
announced prices.  Vickrey auction is demand revealing only under the assumption of 
independent private value, and if the announcement served as a signal, then the independence 
assumption would be violated.  However, we adopted repeated trials because there is no 
decisive evidence that repeated trials are inconsistent with the demand revealing property, and 
there is always an option of discarding later trials. 
Our design of experimental auction is described as follows. At the beginning of the first 
stage, the participants receive an identification number and an instruction packet.    They are told 
not to turn the page until instructed to do so or to communicate with other participants.  Next, 
they receive a budget of $3.00 and explanations on the Vickrey auction procedures.   
Specifically, the monitor conveys the following introduction on the auction procedure: 
“Four brand-name candy bars are auctioned off at the first stage.  Each participant is asked to 
sincerely bid for all four candy bars simultaneously as it is in their best interest.
4  The monitor 
will collect the bids and announces the winner’s (i.e., highest bidder’s) identification number and 
the winning (i.e., second highest) bid for each product.  If two or more participants are the 
winners of a product, the monitor will randomly select one of them as the winner.  If one 
participant is the winner of more than one product, then he or she is asked to choose one product 
to purchase when all trials are completed.
5  For  the  non-chosen  products, the winner will be the 
next highest bidder who is not the winner of any other product.  Thus, there are as many 
winners as there are products.” 
The participants then answer a few quizzes to test for their understanding of the rules of auction.   
The monitor answers all the remaining questions, and the first stage of auction begins.     9
There are three trials of candy bar auctions, but only one of them is binding (i.e., counts) 
in order to control for the wealth effect.    The binding trial is chosen randomly by the monitor at 
the end of the first stage.    After the binding trial is announced, the winners pay the prices for the 
products they won.  The transactions for the candy bar auction are completed before the 
beginning of the second stage so that the participants will see how the auction mechanism works 
before moving on to the second stage.    The first stage is precisely the same as the second-stage 
orange juice auction, except for the fact that the auctioned products are different; the number of 
trials is only half as many; and there is no tasting.  The first stage is designed this way to 
enhance the level of participants’ understanding of our somewhat complicated auction 
mechanism.    Notice, however, that we do not endow the participants with a base product.
6  
At the beginning of the second stage, the participants receive a new identification number 
and a starting budget of $7.00.  They receive the instructions on the auction rules, which are 
almost the same as in the first stage.  Next, they are introduced to the products to be auctioned 
off. Four kinds of orange juice are auctioned: (1) unprocessed (a.k.a., fresh); (2) PEF-processed; 
(3) pasteurized, not-from-concentrate; and (4) pasteurized, from-concentrate.  The participants 
receive descriptions of main characteristics of each product and are allowed to inspect the 
product only visually. In addition, we also design a small poster for each product listing their 
important attributes. On the instruction sheets, they are asked to answer a few quizzes on the 
orange juice characteristics.  The monitor answers all the remaining questions, and the 
second-stage auctions begin.   
There are a total of six trials of auctions in the second stage.
7  The first three trials 
collect naïve bids in that the participants must judge orange juices solely on the basis of color, 
although they may well be familiar with two types of pasteurized orange juice and, to a lesser   10
extent, unprocessed “fresh” juice.    The PEF orange juice has a color similar to the unprocessed 
juice. After the third trial, the participants are allowed to taste the four types of orange juice. 
Consumers would not repurchase a product if they do not like its taste.  Melton et al. point out 
the unreliability of willingness to pay measures based on visual inspection only.    There are three 
more trials after the tasting, and the binding trial is randomly chosen out of the six trials.  The 
binding trial is announced and the transactions are completed.  Before leaving, the participants 
are asked to fill out a questionnaire about demographic information, food purchasing behavior, 
and attitude toward innovative food products.   
Results 
A total of 27 students at The Ohio State University were recruited to participate in the auction 
experiments.  It is not unusual to use student subjects in economic experiments when the 
objective is to test hypotheses about market mechanisms and behavior of rational agents.  
However, as a marketing research tool, economic experiments need to recruit a representative 
sample of the target population.  We hypothesize that willingness to pay for the auctioned 
products depend on participants’ demographic  characteristics.  In  this respect, the use of student 
subject may be questionable in that they are unlikely to represent the targeted population and that 
there is not much variation in demographic characteristics.  Nonetheless, students are also 
regular consumers of orange juice so that they may be somewhat representative of consumers in 
the younger age cohorts. Furthermore, one of our research objectives is to investigate whether or 
not product tasting will alter the WTP estimation. The results obtained from using student 
subjects are still useful. 
During November 2003, four sessions of the orange juice auctions were conducted in a 
laboratory located in the Department of Food Science and Technology at The Ohio State   11
University. Since the PEF processed orange juice was produced in the PEF laboratory and all 
orange juice products needed refrigeration, it was most convenient to conduct the auction 
sessions in their laboratory. All the sessions were completed within 90 minutes. 
Table 1 and figure 2 present the results from candy bar auction. The comparison of 
mean bid prices by trial does not reveal any systematic patterns of changes. For example, for 
Snickers, the mean bid prices decreased from $0.85 in trial 1, to $0.80 in trial 2 and then to $0.75 
in trial 3. On the other hand, the bid prices for Toblerone (made in Switzerland) increased from 
$1.33 in trial 1 to $1.44 in trial 3. The impacts of revealing the winning bid on the subsequent 
trials are not apparent in this experiment. We note that some participants bid higher than $1.00 
for American candy bars; apparently they were not familiar with the candy bar prices. One can 
buy these candy bars for less than $0.50 from most supermarkets, and they cost $1.00 in the 
vending machine in the University. Of course, consumers may be willing to pay higher than the 
store prices if they were very hungry at the auction time. Table 2 presents the overall mean bid 
prices from the three trials.  As expected, the mean bid prices are fairly similar among three 
American candy bars while the mean price of $1.38 for Toblerone is much higher. Again it may 
be due to unfamiliarity with Toblerone, this bid price is lower than the price we paid at the store. 
Table 3 and figure 3 present the auction results by trial from the orange juice auction. 
There are six trials conducted with the first three trials being conducted prior to product tasting 
and three after.  Again there appear to be no systematic patterns of changes that we can trace 
from trial 1 to trial 6. Furthermore, the bid prices for unprocessed and PEF juice are consistently 
higher than the prices for the not-from-concentrate and from-concentrate juice.  Since PEF 
orange juice looks very much like the fresh juice, our description of the attributes of the PEF 
juice seems to be persuasive to the participants. Indeed, the bid prices are higher for PEF than 
unprocessed orange juice for the first three trials prior to product tasting. Note also that the   12
differences in the bid prices between the not-from-concentrate and from-concentrate orange 
juices reasonably reflect the retail market situation.    Therefore, the participants are very familiar 
with the orange juice market.    This is confirmed by the fact that all participants have consumed 
orange juice before the experiment. 
Table 4 shows the mean bid prices before and after product tasting.    Notably, the mean 
bid price for the PEF juice declines substantially after the product tasting, from $2.71 to $2.25, a 
17% drop in the willingness to pay for this new orange juice.  After the auctions, we talked to 
several participants. Some participants said that they did not like the taste of PEF juice, but many 
others said that it tasted like fresh juice.  Also after tasting, the bid price for unprocessed 
“fresh” juice increases from $2.65 to $2.72.  As for the not-from-concentrate and 
from-concentrate juice, the bid prices did not change much after product tasting.  Table 5 
presents the overall mean bid prices from all six trials.    The results show clearly that consumers 
are willing to pay more for the PEF orange juice than the widely-consumed orange juice from 
concentrate and not from concentrate.  Overall,  consumers  are  willing to pay $0.53 more for the 
PEF orange than for not-from-concentrate orange juice.  However, consumers do not treat the 
PEF processed orange juice exactly like the unprocessed fresh orange juice. The sample mean of 
the individual premiuma for the PEF orange juice with respect to its freshness suggests that the 
new product is likely to be competitive in the marketplace since the cost of PEF processing 




This study employed an experimental auction to elicit the willingness to pay for a new orange 
juice processed with the PEF processing technology.  The experiment was designed to auction   13
four alternative products, which are highly substitutable.  However, any participants can only 
win no more than one product.  Even though we conducted six trails for the orange juice 
auction, only one trial is binding.  The second-price Vickrey auction was used for its 
demand-revealing property. 
  In the orange juice auction, we sold four orange juices put into exactly the same half 
gallon containers with the same plain self-adhesive labels.  These products are unprocessed 
fresh juice, PEF juice, not-from-concentrate, and from-concentrate. One important feature of our 
experiment is that the products for auction are all real products and the attributes of the key PEF 
orange juice are either visible or detectable with tasting. This is different from other experiments 
for food safety in which the product attributes are not visible or detectable with tasting. Four 
sessions of experimental auctions were conducted with 27 participants.     
The results show that consumers are willing to pay a premium for the PEF orange juice 
over both the not-from-concentrate and from-concentrate orange juices.  However, consumers 
also revealed that the PEF juice is inferior to the unprocessed fresh juice.    Notably, after tasting 
the products, the mean bid prices for the PEF juice declined substantially, indicating that some 
consumers do not like the taste of PEF juice.  Nevertheless, the significant premiums for the 
PEF juice over the pasteurized juices revealed in this study indicate a strong market potential for 
this new technology in the future. 
The most serious limitation of this study is the use of student subjects.  In the future, 
we plan to conduct similar experiments with the general public.  The cost of recruiting 
representative consumers should be substantially higher than is the case with students, but the 
cost should be still lower than a multicity test marketing program (Hoffman, et al.).    In order to 
explore the true market potential of innovative technology, we believe the cost is worth paying 
for.   14
Footnotes 
1.  Market clearing price is endogenously determined in the popular Vickrey auction, but 
some auction rule (e.g. the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak mechanism) does not have this 
feature. 
2.  Since we only consider single-unit auctions, Vickrey auction and uniform-price auction 
can be used interchangeably. 
3.  A problem with this auction is that an inefficient outcome is quite possible.  If an 
individual has higher values for two products, then it is efficient that he buys both of 
them.  However, as soon as this is allowed, we encounter a problem of demand 
reduction in a multi-unit auction.  If demand reduction is present, the individual’s 
valuation of the second unit is less than the true value, and hence the demand revealing 
property is sacrificed.  Our purpose is to elicit true individual values rather than to 
achieve an efficient outcome or to maximize revenues, so a multi-product single-unit 
auction does not seem to be a bad institution. 
4.  We ask participants directly to bid sincerely.  This kind of  cheap talk may not actually 
induce participants bid sincerely, but we adopt it anyway because we limit the number 
of trials, which might be too few for participants to understand the dominant strategy. 
5.  If a participant is the co-winner of a product and a single winner of another product, 
then the tie breaking precedes.  If the participant is not chosen as the winner of the 
former product, she is required to buy the latter product unless she is a winner of yet 
another product. 
6.  Each participant bids for the products themselves, not for the right to exchange the base 
product with the target product.  For example, Shogren et al. (1994) use the 
“exchange” format.    They use that format because they measure willingness to pay for   15
food safety, holding other things constant.  Hence, it is natural to use the exchange 
format.  In our case, the objective is to observe participants’ private values for the 
product itself, not a particular attribute that it embodies.  Moreover, the exchange 
format requires participants to evaluate two products and calculate the difference in 
values, which should overshadows whatever benefits we might gain from adopting the 
exchange format.    Thus, we do not endow the participants with a base product. 
7.  Some authors use 10 to 20 trials because of the empirical observation that bids begin to 
stabilize after six or seven repetitions (Shogren et al., 1994; Hayes et al.).    In our case, 
participants are assumed to be familiar with the auctioned products to the extent that 
they can come up with their values for the products.    Therefore, we limited the number 
of repetitions. 
   16
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Snickers Butterfinger Milky  Way Toblerone




Table 1. Mean Prices from Candy Bar Auction 
Product Name  Trial 1  Trial 2  Trial 3 
Snickers $0.85  $0.80  $0.75 
Butterfinger $0.75  $0.80  $0.74 
Milky Way  $0.85  $0.76  $0.77 
Toblerone $1.33  $1.38  $1.44 
   21
Table 2. Overall Mean Prices from Candy Bar Auction 
Product Name           M e a n   P r i c e  
Snickers $0.80 
Butterfinger $0.76 
Milky Way  $0.79 
Toblerone $1.38 
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Table 3. Mean Prices by Trial from Orange Juice Auction
a 
Orange Juice Product  Trial 1  Trial 2  Trial 3  Trial 4  Trial 5  Trial 6 
Unprocessed  “fresh” $2.57 $2.67 $2.71 $2.80 $2.64 $2.71 
PEF  $2.58 $2.71 $2.83 $2.31 $2.25 $2.19 
Not  from  Concentrate  $2.03 $1.98 $1.92 $1.83 $1.96 $1.98 
From  Concentrate  $1.29 $1.26 $1.26 $1.30 $1.44 $1.33 
aPrices are in dollars per half gallon.   23
Table 4. Mean Prices Of Orange Juice Before and After Tasting
a 
Orange Juice Product  Mean Price Before Tasting  Mean Price After Tasting 
Unprocessed “fresh”  $2.65  $2.72 
PEF   $2.71  $2.25 
Not from Concentrate    $1.98  $1.93 
From Concentrate    $1.27  $1.36 
aPrices are in dollars per half gallon.   24
Table 5. Overall Mean Prices from Orange Juice Auction
a 
P r o d u c t   N a m e           M e a n   P r i c e  
Fresh $2.68 
PEF $2.48 
Not from concentrate  $1.95 
From Concentrate  $1.31 



















From Concentrate Orange Juice Not-from concentrate Orange Juice
PEF Orange Juice Fresh Orange Juice
Figure 3. Mean prices by trial from orange juice auction 
 
 
 
 
 